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Introduction 
   
Liberal democratic theory has not adequately addressed the tension between 
democracy and capitalism and this can be seen most clearly when trying to develop a 
political theory of taxation.  Liberal democratic and public finance experts on taxation 
have focused on principles of justice and fairness.  The imposition of specific kinds of 
taxes on Africans well after the beginning of colonialism in South Africa will help 
shed light on the internal challenges to liberalism that such a principled approach to 
taxation reveals.  Through an extended exegesis on colonial tax policy, I will show 
how a faith in civilization, a racialized belief in the educative value of wage work, and 
pure economic interest co-mingle in the liberal principled approach to taxes.  
Taxation in the modern era both assumes people as wage earners and 
constructs them as such.  However, this observation has not been central to approaches 
by public finance scholars or liberal theorists.  More significantly, any theory of 
taxation must attend to the historical presence of conversations around taxation that 
focused on interaction between “coercion” of labor in opposition to slavery.  While it 
has been assumed that taxation is primarily for the accrual and maintenance of revenue 
for a state, a rigorous analysis of the liberal approach to wage work in confrontation 
with subsistence work reveals a more complex set of expectations and motivations 
surrounding tax policy and tax theory.  Though I focus here specifically on such 
expectations in South Africa in the late 19
th
 century, it is in order to illuminate a more 
general point about the way that taxation functions in political communities.  This 
helps to expand the question of justice in taxation to include a more nuanced rendering 
of how abstract principles of fairness or justice interact with ideologies of civilization 
and work.   
The ability to understand wage work as in tension with the practice of freedom 
is made easier in the colonial South African example.  This is not to suggest that 
people no longer understand the way that taxation assumes wage earners, but to point 
out that the initial coercive element of wage work changes over time to become less 
contestable, more normalized.   Moreover, wage work no longer confronts the political 
theoretical landscape as a choice.  Contemporary approaches to the question of 
governance, like contemporary actors for the most part, do not experience wage work 
as one option among many, but as the only option.  In that sense, the vividness with 
which we can perceive the nineteenth century confrontation between colonial 
approaches and colonized people reflects on contemporary practice more than much 
contemporary theory does. 
  In 19
th
 century South Africa we have an interesting record of conversations 
between and among Africans and Europeans as to the meaning of taxation for 
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democracy.  There are clear parallels between state formation in South Africa and the 
United States that make the South African example helpful for understanding 
contemporary political theory written by Americans
i
.   Rereading the historical 
problem of taxation in colonial and post-colonial societies should involve the 
recognition of a fundamental tension between democratic thought and the “necessary” 
establishment of taxation.  The anxiety of discovering a distinction between coercing 
labor and providing incentives proves to be a central issue for the post-facto 
legitimation of taxation.  The conversations of the late 19
th
 century in South Africa 
around taxation draw attention to how democratic thought presupposes the consistency 
of wage labor with democracy, perhaps to the detriment of the spirit of democracy.  
The focus on the assumption of wage labor draws inspiration from Marx and many 
thinkers in the Marxist tradition in order to draw attention to how deeply the 
“economy” and “politics” are intertwined.  Taxation is both a material and symbolic 
focal point that reveals liberal approaches to work in tension with the ideal of 
democracy as a move from slavery to freedom.  
 
Un-free democratic subjects 
 
Scholars studying colonialism have frequently stressed the importance of taxes 
for promoting wage labor, but it also should also be added that tax policies were 
intended to educate individual Africans into becoming paradoxically un-free 
democratic subjects.  By paradoxically un-free democratic subjects, I am suggesting a 
potentially irresolvable tension between being a (coerced) wage earner and a 
democratic actor.  This tension was noticeably comprehended by colonial officials, 
and the attempt to resolve it theoretically centered on the view that wage labor is 
necessary for independence, which in turn can only be provided through a civilizing 
state. The role that theories of civilization, race and pedagogical rule played in the 
formation of the tax policies and subsequently the South African State are significant 
in that they shed light on the meanings of taxation, not only in South Africa but 
elsewhere. Tax policies in the colonial era were not merely a way of getting money 
but were more fundamentally a way to create an African wage labor force.
ii
  
Though tribute-paying and taxation were common among African 
communities before the introduction of colonial taxation systems,
iii
  the majority of 
Africans in the interior of the southern Africa region were not integrated into the 
world system until the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century.   That is, most Africans lived in 
dispersed economies, many of them subsistence oriented.  There is little evidence to 
suggest that northward expansion on the part of white settlers around the Cape of 
Good Hope would have proceeded so quickly and drastically without the discovery of 
diamonds and gold farther north in what is now South Africa.   Despite several 
hundred years of settlement (beginning with the Dutch in the 17
th
 century) and the use 
of copper, iron and gold in Southern Africa for over a millennium, the push to 
introduce a coherent tax system on/for Africans can be plainly traced to the 1867 
discovery of diamonds in the Vaal area of what was then a Boer Republic.  By the 
1860’s, European settlers (both British and Boer) were removing small outcrops of 
copper in the Cape Colony and gold in the Eastern Transvaal but the discovery of 
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diamonds sparked the massive influx of European capital and beginnings of ardent 
South African state-building
 
.
iv
  
In 1867, the year that diamonds were discovered near the Orange River, the 
Colonial Secretary “laid one of the earliest stones on the table of the Cape House of 
Assembly [and said]…’Gentleman, this is the rock on which the future success of 
South Africa will be built’.”v The mining rush that ensued led to the consolidation of 
dispersed and disorganized small mining operations into large monopolies, led by 
Cecil Rhodes, who eventually also became the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony.  
What allowed such a rapid and complete involvement of British capitalists in the Vaal 
area was the reduction of the autonomous powers of the Boer republics and the 
ensuing dialogue between British colonial officials, Boer representatives, and (mostly 
British) mine owners.  Much of this dialogue involved strategies to create a labor force 
to work the new and dangerous mines.     
 Despite the large numbers of people “available” as potential workers in the 
mines, labor was experienced as a scarce resource to the early mine owners, Boer 
representatives and colonial officials.  In order to deal with this there was, according 
to Farouk Stemmet, a period of enticement and then one of coercion in which taxes 
were introduced.
vi
  The initial period of enticement was based on a vague notion of 
“free labor,” with the attendant expectation that the potential to earn cash was enough 
to get workers into the dangerous mines, though it was a short time until farmers 
advocated land restrictions and poll taxes were introduced in order to “ensure that no 
African remained outside the imperatives of the cash economy.”vii  This also ensured 
that no African was too wealthy to avoid wage-labor by draining any surplus wealth 
and labor that might have otherwise existed.  This move to coerce Africans into wage 
labor came after an attempt by the mine owners to bring in workers from China and 
then India.
viii
 
Sven Steinmo has traced the development of progressive taxes in Britain 
around this time period.  He argues that there were two forces in the changing world 
political economy that explain the transformation from classical to modern tax 
systems; “one supported political and social equality in society, the other demanded 
increased revenues on the part of the state, and together these two impulses brought 
about new tax ideas and structures.”ix Classical taxes had been complicated systems 
with “little consistent logic driving the system as a whole or allowing people to make 
sense of the choices of one type of tax over another—other than the state’s need for 
money.”x In this sense it is interesting to note that what was so “progressive” about 
progressive taxes is precisely that they have a justification beyond simply the need for 
money by the state
xi
.  Other theories of taxation offer an explanation of tax policy in 
terms of the theory of predatory rule.  Margaret Levi argues that “the history of state 
revenue production is the history of the state.”xii  In this sense the changes and reforms 
of the revenue collection system, as well as the explicit and tacit aims of the system, 
are a useful lens through which to view the evolution of the state more generally.  Her 
argument assumes that rulers are always maximizing state revenue but that they 
operate within a system of constraints that in turn determine the choice of revenue 
system.  Within these constraints rulers will “design revenue production policies that 
maximize revenues to the state.”xiii  Levi’s model, then, is static “in the sense that, at 
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any given point in time, policy choices are a consequence of a given set of bargaining 
resources, transaction costs, and discount rates.”xiv   
One of the many assumptions that Levi makes when looking at taxation and 
revenue collection more generally is that individual tax payers have a certain amount 
of choice in joining or not joining the state in question or that rulers recognize a 
certain degree of responsibility towards those they are ruling.
xv
  This assumption of 
ruler accountability runs counter to evidence in most colonial situations.
xvi
 This is 
because rulers (however broadly understood in Levi’s account) are not faced with the 
same constituent constraints in colonial situations.  While they may continue to have 
the constraints imposed on them by the constituents of the home country, colonialism 
is usually characterized by its relative lack of concern for the indigenous peoples in 
question.  Levi and others assume that taxation schemes are always and primarily 
about revenue collection.  In fact, this is central to her argument.  However, the 
discovery of diamonds and gold in southern Africa prompted a whole series of tax 
policies and land reforms that had as their stated objective the forced introduction of 
Africans into wage labor via the moneyed economy.    
Although revenue was of course collected, it is clear that revenue collection 
was not the justification offered for the introduction of the system of taxation 
(including Hut, head, dog and poll taxes) for Africans.  When revenue collection was 
mentioned during debates about taxing Africans, it was incidental.  For example, 
Charles Goldmann presented evidence in the Report of the Industrial Commission of 
Inquiry into the Gold Mining Industry (1897) that “if the dignity of labor were 
impressed upon [Africans] by the enforcement of this [native tax] law, we are likely to 
get a larger supply.  The other purpose served would be...additional revenue to the 
Government.”xvii Here the idea is that Africans were not sufficiently schooled in the 
practice of free labor; tax law would be an educative exercise.  The justification 
commonly associated with taxation systems (revenue collection) is explicitly stated as 
secondary.  As can be seen in the goal to create an African labor force, revenue 
collection is far less important than theories of the educative goal of labor and 
racialized assumptions about the importance of civilization. 
 
Make the empire pay  
 
In 1922 the retired British colonial official Sir Frederick Lugard published his 
treatise The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa.  Lugard’s text became the 
virtual handbook of colonial officials in Africa after its publication.
xviii
  In the context 
of post-war Britain, Lugard’s book was timely to debates about imperialism, on the 
one hand acknowledging that motivations on the part of Britain were not entirely for 
the benefit of Africans but notably maintaining that the interests of the European 
industrial classes are consistent with the British colonial mandate, most especially its 
commitment to Africans. As a result, Lugard suggested that “the benefit can be made 
reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilized administration to fulfil[sic] this 
dual mandate.”xix  He follows the logic of the principles of ability to pay and interest, 
making him at least in part an heir to the legacy of Adam Smith and John Stuart 
Mill.
xx
  For him tax payment is tied up with the benefits of government and “marks the 
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recognition of the principle that each individual in proportion to his means has an 
obligation to the State, to which he owes security for life and property, and his 
increased wealth,--due to fair wages for his labor, improved transport, and a large 
competitive market for his produce.”xxi  In this section I will highlight now a mix of 
racialized assumptions and a view of the educative function of wage labor for freedom 
came together in colonial tax policy.   
Lugard recommends that compulsion to work is no longer a good justification 
for “native taxation.”  Citing Cecil Rhodes’ 1894 Glenn Grey Act in South Africa, he 
argues that such a system had as its goal a means of compelling individual Africans to 
work.
xxii
 He notes that the impetus behind the Act was a consideration that “the 
native…should be made to work, because he had for so long forced his women to 
work in order that he might live in idleness.”xxiii  He also usefully points out that this 
reasoning has precedent; “the substitution of labor for the payment of a tax, or the 
imposition of a heavier tax if the native cannot prove that he has worked for a 
specified time, are expedients which in the past have been adopted elsewhere.”xxiv  In 
this way, it is widely understood that taxation was a means to self-consciously enlarge 
the wage labor force.  While Lugard argues against this principle of taxation as 
creating wage labor, he specifically ascribes its inception to South Africa in the late 
19th century, invoking Poll taxes at the request of mine management and European 
farmers.  In other words, thirty years after the discovery of diamonds and gold in 
South Africa, it was well understood that taxes had been created not for revenue but to 
coerce Africans into the mines.   
In discussing further his approach to taxes, he emphasizes the idea that a 
personal contribution to the state (and he here suggests it should be in proportion to 
wealth) is something that needs to be both taught and learned.  As such, he 
recommends that taxes should be extremely light in the beginning, “since it is there 
intended to be educative rather than a source of revenue.”xxv  In a sense the argument 
presented here is a semantic one; the compulsion to work was directed both at the 
individual African perceived as lazy (taxation as education for the individual African) 
and at an entire black labor force that needed to be incited by coercion (taxation as a 
means of forcing people out of traditional economies more generally).   The two are 
inextricably bound.  The point is that while the institution of tax systems was 
consciously implemented to coerce labor it was also executed as a method of political 
education.  The two motivations were not always clearly demarcated.  Moreover, 
Lugard eclipses the original motivation of policies such as the Glen Grey Act that are 
aimed at creating a labor force, perhaps updating the language. 
 
Under normal conditions the African rarely needs 
compulsion to work, and this is not the object of the tax 
I have proposed, but in so far as the tax stimulates 
productive industry, and compels a man, as in England, 
to provide an extra margin wherewith to meet the 
obligation, or if it diminishes the large surplus of the 
grain crops, which among many pagan tribes is set aside 
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for brewing liquor with which to indulge in frequent 
drunken orgies, its effect can only be good.
xxvi
 
 
While on the surface Lugard is merely refuting the idea that compulsion to work is the 
motivation behind taxation, what he is also saying is that it is not unusual (nor the 
same) to argue that taxation stimulates more productivity.  This is perhaps double 
speak in the sense that he is arguing that Africans may not need stimulus to work but if 
that is the effect, that is a good thing.  Moreover, making the assumption that workers 
will spend their wages on consumption goods like alcohol or will use grain for that 
purpose is presumptuous.  However, it should be noted that Lugard himself makes the 
link between the principle of establishing workers via taxation in South Africa with a 
similar effect in England. 
  The civilizing mission, according to Lugard, is very much a system of 
education.  Instead of reading this educative function easily, I propose that it is a very 
powerful metaphor that requires much attention and perhaps can shed light not only on 
the colonial context, but government more broadly understood.  Here taxation is 
understood to play a metaphorically educative role, though sometimes it is confusedly 
intertwined with literally changing behavior rather than promoting an understanding.  
In a sense we may understand the educative mission of the British through Lugard as 
having a component of a rote learning method where literal action in successive 
repetition (i.e.: labor) educates the student in that action.  Lugard calls upon fellow 
colonial official Lord Milner to emphasize the distinction; it “is absolutely opposed to 
compulsory labour for private employment…It is a point of fundamental 
importance…that there is no question of force or compulsion, but only of 
encouragement and advice through the native chiefs and headmen.”xxvii  The issue of 
to what degree labor could be enforced or imposed was prickly in colonial policy and 
theory, in no small part because many reasoned that the benefit of colonial rule 
involved the abolition of slavery.  In this sense, it understandably became confusing to 
the British officials and certainly to Africans subject to colonial policies, as to the 
difference between slavery and wage labor that was, they saw, coerced in sometimes 
subtle but more often explicit ways. 
 As for the issue of racialized assumptions, I read Lugard’s work as a whole as 
having a consistency in its approach to questions that involve allegedly immutable 
ascriptive characteristics of Africans.  Despite noting obvious differences among 
colonies, The Dual Mandate as a whole posits an “African” or “Native” character that 
appears at least to Lugard to be interchangeable in various locations and consistent 
across the vast continent.  For this reason, and also because of explicit claims on his 
part, it is useful to read his remarks as if they might guide South African policy (or, 
had previously), despite the fact that South Africa was no longer under British control 
at the time.  So when he says that “it has long been the fashion to speak of the African 
as naturally lazy, leaving work to his women, and contented to lie in the sun and eat 
and drink”xxviii it is with the assumption that this is a character attribute associated with 
Africans in general, regardless of their physical locale. While he observes the 
“fashion” of speaking of Africans in this way, Lugard also refutes the stereotype and 
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submits a new one; “It would seem, however…that there are few races which are more 
naturally industrious.”xxix  
 This “natural industriousness,” Lugard continues, applies to labor performed 
for wages as well.   
 
As a wage-earner he has not the plodding application of 
the Chinaman, and ‘he makes no pretence of taking 
pride in planting cotton or tobacco for someone else,’ 
says Mr. Wilson; but this writer emphatically denies that 
the native in Nyasaland [Malawi] is idle and leaves most 
of the work to his women, and he cannot think why 
Europeans persist in assuming that a Native lives in 
degrading idleness unless working for a European.
xxx
 
 
At this point Lugard is answering Mr. Wilson’s piece on the character of work in 
Nyasaland (modern-day Malawi) natives in particular. It is clear from the context of 
his remarks as a whole that this is an evidentiary accident in the sense that it though 
Lugard certainly has been to Nyasaland, he is referring to a more general characteristic 
of “Africans” throughout the continent.  This approach to the question of work seems 
to be a remarkably progressive one, at least in the sense that Lugard is poking fun at 
the idea that Europeans consider African labor as valid and useful only when it is work 
for Europeans.  What is unclear from this passage though is whether Lugard is 
consciously aware that wage work is specifically associated in the African context 
with work for Europeans.  Wage work depends on a uniformly accepted currency, or 
something with which to pay wages, a notably missing component outside of work for 
Europeans.   
 Responding again, this time to a Mr. Orr, Lugard continues his defense of the 
African work ethic, again highlighting the role that incentives play.  
 
As to the quality of the work done by the wage-earner, 
Captain Orr says, I think very truly: ‘The whole question 
of industry and idleness depends almost on incentive.  
When the African native is given an incentive to work, 
he will work in a way that is sometimes 
astounding…Give him an interest in his task, encourage 
his initiative by making him think for himself, thrust 
responsibility upon him, demand results, and not the 
mere mechanical performance of labor, and he will be 
found surprisingly industrious.
xxxi
 
 
Here again is Lugard’s relatively progressive attitude, but this time betraying 
assumptions that may be less about African workers than workers in general.  The 
most important distinction here is that the quality of work depends on the context in 
which incentives are offered, as well as the content of the incentives themselves.  In 
this way, Lugard and Orr make the case that labor is most effective when it is the 
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result of at least a degree of initiative on the part of the worker. Further, it seems to 
imply that self-initiative (thinking for oneself, having a real purpose or goal, taking 
pride in the work) is an important component of the structuring of work environments.  
In retrospect, we can see that this is consistent with the approach to work of British 
liberalism, at least in theory. 
 Lugard’s views on work need to be put further into context because of the 
presumption that there are situations in which labor can and should be coerced.  His 
understanding that there is a space where coercion is justified provides a limit case for 
his own views. This is because he is reflecting on the assumption that there may be 
conditions under which the coercion of labor is still consistent with the concept of 
“free labor” as wage work is often referred to.  So, Lugard asks, “in what 
circumstances and by what methods, then, is it justifiable for a Government to resort 
to compulsion in the employment of paid labor?”xxxii  The phrasing of the question 
already reveals an important assumption: that there are circumstances and methods by 
which it is justifiable for governments to resort to compulsion.  His answer, though, is 
even more illuminating.   
 
The reasons given in the bluebook for compulsion in 
East Africa do not appear to be limited to Government 
necessity, but include desirability of training the natives 
to work, so that they shall not “live in idleness and 
vice.”  The payment of tax by labor in lieu of cash, as in 
Uganda, is a different matter, and, as I have said, it is 
preferable that the labor should be paid in full and the 
amount of the tax subsequently refunded, so as to make 
the distinction perfectly clear.
xxxiii
   
 
The link between compulsion to work and taxation seems, even if somewhat 
confusing, to be a direct association.  The Uganda example should also be juxtaposed 
to an earlier, and perhaps more severe, illustration of the relationship in the Congo.  
Early colonial rule in the Congo was directly tied to the extraction of rubber from the 
interior of the country.  For this reason, the imposition of taxes and the connection to 
forced labor was pronounced because rather than paying taxes in currency, African 
men over a certain age were required to bring a pre-allotted amount of rubber directly 
from the interior.  This tax came with the penalty of limb loss, and it is perhaps 
important that taxation became synonymous in the Congo with cruelty and forced 
labor.
xxxiv
 
 In some sense, what Lugard is referring to is a practice of “hiding” the 
magnitude to which taxation obliges labor.  The connection between forced labor and 
taxation is seen in coincidence, again, with education.  So it is no surprise that Lugard 
dwells on the educative effects of compulsory labor. 
 
The educative results of compulsory labour depend on 
the conditions under which it is employed, and are not a 
primary reason for resorting to compulsion for public 
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works, for it is, of course, possible to compel natives to 
work for their own or their community’s benefit instead 
of for the white man’s wages.xxxv 
 
This nuanced understanding of the interaction between education, compulsion, and 
wage labor again upholds an evident progressive allure on the surface.  One interesting 
distinction in this passage, though, is the relative equation of public works with white 
man’s wages, juxtaposed against “their own or their community’s benefit.”  This is 
perhaps an oversight, but a significant one for the overall argument that Lugard is 
trying to sustain about the mutually beneficial colonial system because it really does 
discern a difference between what might be of benefit to Africans and what is of 
benefit to Europeans, without bridging the gap in between and arguing that they are 
consistent with each other.  
 This underestimation of lack of mutual benefit seems all the more glaring 
because Lugard has at least some recognition of the distinct distrust with which many 
Africans viewed wage work.  However, his interpretation of this skepticism is that 
“primitive tribes are suspicious, and fear employment by the white man.”xxxvi  He 
maintains hope, however, that this suspicion will be remedied with the advent of the 
work itself for he argues that “in such a case the wages paid, and the good treatment 
received, should have the effect of removing these fears and suspicions, so that 
compulsion may no longer be necessary, and free voluntary labor take its place.”xxxvii  
The logic here is that people fear what they do not know and once they know 
something, it will no longer be feared.  Under this explanation the payment of the 
wage dispels the fear.   In another sense it is also perhaps quite candid reasoning on 
his part; people may fear and resent wage work, but once it becomes normalized and 
regularized, it will be accepted and no longer feared.  The process of normalization 
includes not only an increased familiarization with wage work, but also and more 
importantly recognition that it is no longer a choice.   
 While Lugard may hope that the suspicion of wage work will be a mere kink to 
be worked out in the process of wage labor itself, he is also somewhat indeterminate 
about the extent to which the rectifying of this suspicion should be the motivation for 
labor policies.  Rather, when the issue becomes one of the “benefit” of the African, he 
quickly suggests that it is quite a different matter altogether, asserting that it is a 
matter to be dealt with in education, not labor.  The link between the two is clear to the 
reader, even if Lugard tries to separate them from one another.  So, when Lugard 
establishes that   “The question of the measure of compulsion which is admissible or 
advisable in order to induce the African to work, solely for his own moral and material 
benefit and advancement, is one which belongs rather to the subject of education than 
to that of labor,”xxxviii he appears to be trying to unscramble issues that are inevitably 
scrambled.   He also seems to recognize the degree to which the question of the benefit 
to African laborers was dealt with within the context of questions about labor.  Why 
might Lugard want to disentangle the developmental advantages of labor and move 
them to education?  Perhaps compulsory African labor was not intended to benefit the 
Africans in any way, but was to benefit European colonialists and the home country, 
often explicitly so.  Any reflection on the benefits to Africans seems post hoc and 
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perhaps merely justifications for existing policies.  But, the purpose of the Dual 
Mandate was to argue that the system was mutually beneficial, so why not take the 
issue head on, in the realm of labor where it really began?  Perhaps Lugard has seen 
the limits to his own argument, or perhaps he is less reflexive on the connection 
between labor and education than he seems. 
 For Lugard mere compulsion to work wasn’t necessarily of benefit to Africans, 
in itself.  Understandably a ridiculous proposition for contemporary ears (at least 
framed in this way), it was not necessarily so at that time.  For example, his views are 
in part formed in response to the East African Bishops who supported the idea that 
obligation to work is “in itself a justifiable means to an end – the advancement of the 
natives themselves.”xxxix  Rather, Lugard’s own views seem to be more indirect.  That 
is, he seems to suggest, again, that work itself should not necessarily be a goal, nor is 
it necessarily of benefit per se to Africans. In his remarks on education, it does become 
somewhat clearer as to what the indirect benefit of work would be on Africans.  For 
Lugard “the object which education in Africa must have in view must be to fit the 
ordinary individual to fill a useful part in his environment, with happiness to 
himself.”xl   This is consistent with a liberal approach to taxation in general.  Similarly, 
he goes on to clarify that education is “to ensure that the exceptional individual shall 
use his abilities for the advancement of the community and not to its detriment, or to 
the subversion of constituted authority.”xli  The simultaneous objectives of making 
individuals useful, advancing the community, and buttressing authority are the 
lynchpins of civilization.   
 The civilizing mission, Lugard observes, comes with a capacity for unintended 
consequences that may in turn sabotage the character of the mission.   So, when 
Lugard notices that “the impact of European civilization on tropical races has indeed a 
tendency to undermine that respect for authority which is the basis of social order,”xlii 
he is burdened with the task of reconciling this observation with the goal of 
constituting authority.  Ultimately, Lugard’s response discloses an inconsistency that 
is probably widespread: creating self-confident and empowered citizens in the arts of 
democracy, at the risk of undermining constituted authority because it ostensibly 
promotes self-government.  However, for Lugard the outcome is already established, 
and its authority has already been constituted.  So rather than attack this fundamental 
discrepancy, Lugard contextualizes that the social order being undermined in the case 
of colonialism is, or should be, local (African) authority.  Here the uprooting of the 
social order is a “measure of progress”xliii because it will be replaced by a different 
(and better) liberal social order.  Lugard’s understanding of education in this way 
noticeably elides the possibility that the liberal order itself is undermined by the 
teaching of its major principles.
xliv
  
The motivation behind Lugard’s focus on education, then, brings us full circle.  
He argues that the colonial state should be responsible for educating Africans 
precisely because it is “our duty to the natives, and our responsibility to 
civilization.”xlv  The duality of the British mandate is responsibility toward African 
subjects, though the relationship between their subjecthood and citizenship remains 
elusive.  Through moral instruction, Lugard maintains, good character can be molded 
best by example and personal contact, rewarding “honesty, self-control, and 
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industry”xlvi in African students.  Moreover, he appeals to his European readers that “It 
is indeed essential that democracy should take an intelligent and well-informed 
interest in questions which affect the Empire of which it is the inheritor and 
trustee.”xlvii  Lugard is confident that the burden of the British mandate will be 
rewarded.
xlviii
  The idea that Africans enjoy more freedom under the colonial state 
seems misplaced now, but there was logic to the connection for Lugard.  His faith in 
the British Empire was based on a belief in a certain kind of responsibility toward 
Africans.  This responsibility is inextricably linked to the justifications for, or 
explanations of, taxation in the context of British rule.  In this sense, taxation was 
integral to his view that the liberal democratic state performs an educative function 
through wage labor that characterizes civilization.  
 
Meanings of taxation  
 
 The tension in the colonial context between racialized assumptions, wage 
labor, and civilization can be clarified somewhat by examining Marx’s views of 
freedom and how that relates to taxation. For Marx, “taxes are the economic basis of 
the government machinery and nothing else.”xlix There is, however, a deep interaction 
between the institution of taxation and the perpetuation of an illusory form of human 
freedom.  Lugard’s struggle with the difference between free and coerced labor as it 
relates to taxation should be seen in light of his unwillingness to question the marriage 
of civilization and capitalism.  This would come as no surprise to Marx, though, for he 
once said that “taxation is the fifth god, side by side with property, the family, order, 
and religion.”l This diagnosis of capitalism is in large part because of the effect of 
economic structures on the ability of people to relate to each other as humans.  For 
Marx human nature can be illustrated by the concept of “species being.”li The lack of 
consciousness and will characterized by wage labor is an obstacle to human 
fulfillment and therefore to species being because, according to Marx, it prohibits us 
from seeing each other as part of the same species.  Capitalist society has been 
structured by economic relationships that render human relationships abject. 
 Humans are alienated from one another as a result of the particular structure of 
production under capitalism.  The concept of alienation works on multiple levels, 
though, and the first important facet of it concerns workers being alienated from the 
product of their work.  In this way, a worker’s labor “becomes an object” that “exists 
outside him” and further becomes “a power of its own confronting him.”lii  It exists 
outside of the worker precisely because she does not own the product but is paid a 
wage to produce it, thereby rendering her influence on the product non-existent and 
controlled by another (the owner of the product who pays her the wage to produce it).   
The worker continues to produce under this system because she is coerced to do so in 
order to live within a market-society for which the worker has nothing to offer but her 
labor.
liii
  If she did have something else to offer, she would be a part of the owning 
class.  As it is, though, she does not work freely precisely because there is no option of 
declining to work.  For Marx, it is through work that we create what it means to be 
human, which is why when work is not deliberate but forced we become alienated 
from our work, ourselves, and other humans.  Moreover, because of the lack of control 
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over the product and work process, alienation makes biological survival the purpose of 
the species, contra our nature.
liv
  In part because of this, a further aspect of alienation 
concerns Marx: the propensity under capitalism to compete with other human beings 
rather than work with them. 
 In contradistinction to alienation, Marx and Engels make use of a concept of 
freedom that is marked by its difference from liberal conceptions of freedom.  For 
them, freedom is tied directly to consciousness in that a human being is free if he 
“contemplates himself in a world he has created.”lv  Under capitalism, the worker still 
participates in creating the world, but is unable to contemplate this relationship 
properly because of her alienation from her own work, herself, and others.  The 
alienation of workers affects the potential for freedom in society as a whole, for 
though personal freedom may exist under capitalism to a certain degree, the capitalist 
mode of production does not allow for humans to consciously plan their production 
processes with a view to how this will affect the nature of society and human nature. 
The idea here is that “freely associated human beings” is a direct result of productive 
mechanisms.
lvi
  Instead, what we have under capitalism is not only worker alienation 
in the sense that people are forced to take orders, do repetitive work, and have no real 
say over working hours or decisions affecting the work process, but also in the sense 
that workers themselves are commodified.    
 In that sense, the uneasy distinction that Lugard was trying to designate 
between wage labor, education and slavery breaks down from a Marxist perspective.  
Lugard’s faith in civilization and attempt to articulate a dual mandate is reflective of a 
fetishstic approach to the state.  The attempt to provide a non-coercive rationale for 
taxation masks the prior coercive nature of the wage labor itself, which was itself the 
impetus for the taxes in the first place.  The slippage between coercion and incentive 
in wage labor was understood by colonial subjects to a greater extent than by colonial 
officials, and it impacts the view one might take on meaning of civilization.  In 1957 
Lord Hailey remarked “it might almost be said that the African begins to be 
recognized as a member of civilized society when he becomes subject to the payment 
of income tax instead of poll tax.”lvii  His argument is that Africans have now earned 
the right to be subject only to income or property taxes, like Europeans of the time.  
Income taxes are paid on income earned, whereas the taxes most used in the colonial 
context weren’t pegged to income but were pegged to the individual qua individual.  
In order to understand the relevant distinction between taxes on income and a poll tax, 
we can examine why resistance to taxes took the forms that it did. 
In the late 19
th
 century African resistance to taxation can be traced to an 
editorial in the first African language newspaper in South Africa, by its founder, J.T. 
Jabavu.  In it he makes a case against the taxation policies of the government while 
also accepting the civilizing discourse that accompanies it.  Jabavu, an early African 
activist, was often criticized as reformist at the time of the African National Congress 
(ANC)’s formation.  In the late nineteenth century, however, he was in a unique 
position to speak out against government policies, and in Xhosa.   Published in 
November of 1884, Jabavu’s editorial in Imvo Zabantsundu does not question the right 
of the government to tax Africans, but asserts that they are unable to pay.  There is no 
doubt, for Jabavu, that “the Natives owe the money” but the question of when and by 
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what means is what occupies his piece.  So, as he points out “It will be said, as it was 
said in the meeting, these people must go to work.  But it is not easy to get our people 
to do two things at once.”lviii  The purpose here was to convince the government to not 
seize cattle and land because taxes had not been paid.  However, he grants the idea 
that Africans must go to work, but does not point out in any way that the “other” thing 
that they must do is also to work.  That is, his argument is that many Africans need to 
be out in the fields for subsistence work, but that eventually they will have time to 
return to wage work.  This is perhaps one of the reasons Jabavu later comes under 
much fire from the ANC, for he is extremely careful to not disrupt the purposes of 
government more than is necessary for his modest aims.   
Historian Sean Redding has observed that it is unexpected, given the harshness 
and inequality of tax policy toward Africans in South Africa, that there were 
surprisingly few revolts.  Her explanation for this is that, at least in the case of the 
1880 Transkeian Rebellion, “the collection of hut tax became a state ritual that 
recreated and reinforced bonds between ruler and ruled.”lix  More importantly, though, 
she shows the way in which taxation and witchcraft united to make the colonial state 
seem particularly malicious and that the information on hut tax registers represented a 
potential threat to the African population. This threat was material and supernatural. 
As such, she concludes that relatively high compliance rates on the part of Africans 
can be explained by the symbolic content of tax payments, “reflecting an 
acknowledgement of the historical reality of the loss of African independence.”lx  This 
loss of independence was accompanied by relative lack of interaction between the 
state and many Africans, apart from the payment of taxes, which Redding argues were 
a form of “buying” autonomy from the state.lxi Redding’s research highlights the way 
that many Africans took note of the contradictory nature of Lugard’s defense of 
taxation.   
 In part this symbolic interaction over taxation can be seen as a confrontation 
between modes of viewing the world that are materially based, but that mix with 
existing non-material beliefs.  Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital was 
first published in 1913 and provides an interpretation not only of imperialism, but of 
taxation. This interpretation helps to make sense of how and why many Africans saw 
taxes as especially malevolent.   Luxemburg argues that the primary way in which 
states can use taxation is to create a consumption class, “non-capitalist consumers,”lxii 
coexistent with economies that are non-capitalist.  It is one of Luxemburg’s greatest 
contributions to Marxism that she pointed out that capitalist and non-capitalist modes 
of production co-exist.  Moreover, the existence of non-capitalist modes may be in the 
interest of capital.  In her view, modern taxation is “responsible for forcing commodity 
economy on the peasants,”lxiii but the way that it does this is by forcing them to 
produce more and more for the market – not necessarily producing more, but certainly 
producing more as commodities.  In this way it also increases commodity 
consumption because people are no longer as able to fulfill their own needs via their 
own production, since a portion of it must become commodities in the sense that they 
must be traded for money.  So, for Luxemburg it is the case that 
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Capitalism is the first mode of economy with the 
weapon of propaganda, a mode which tends to engulf 
the entire globe and to stamp out all other economies, 
tolerating no rival by its side.  Yet at the same time it is 
also the first mode of economy which is unable to exist 
by itself, which needs other economic systems as 
medium and toil.
lxiv
 
 
And for Luxemburg, taxation was a method both of promoting capital, and also of 
preserving other economies to a certain extent while coexisting with a capitalist mode 
of production.  The case of South Africa seems to be a good example of this.  And in 
fact, Luxemburg’s approach to South Africa makes a nice juxtaposition with Lugard’s.  
She contrasts the methods of the British with those of the Boers, arguing that the 
Boers stood for “out-dated slavery on a petty scale” while the British supported 
“modern large-scale capitalist exploitation of the land and natives.”lxv   Moreover, she 
points out that the British government “for a long time…appeared as protector of the 
natives,”lxvi an appearance no doubt reinforced by Lugard’s Dual Mandate only nine 
years later.  According to Luxemburg, though, “British capital revealed its real 
intentions”lxvii only after diamonds and gold were discovered.   
 When Lugard wrote The Dual Mandate, he was in part responding to Leonard 
Woolf’s Empire and Commerce in Africa: A Study in Economic Imperialism.  Woolf’s 
analysis bears some affinity with Luxemburg’s, and was published in 1920.  In this 
book, Woolf makes a number of observations that provide useful context for Lugard’s 
approach.  One thing he points out is the affinity of the contemporary state to a joint-
stock company.
lxviii
  This is an apt metaphor for his topic because it was joint-stock 
companies that blazed the trail for colonial authority.  While to a certain extent his 
analysis contains an economic determinism in that he assumes that organized national 
power is also primarily an economic instrument, the interpretation makes sense in its 
historical moment as a counter to the hegemonic liberal discourse defending 
colonialism and imperialism.  Moreover he cites Chamberlain directly on this point, 
making a strong case that he is merely representing the stated aim that “the state…is 
an organization for the pursuit of the economic ends of nations.”lxix  With critical 
appraisals of the state’s actions in Africa and elsewhere, Lugard felt it was his duty to 
defend colonial policies by introducing the “dual mandate” approach, reconciling the 
stated aims of economic advancement for the British Empire with the traditional tenets 
of liberalism.   
The theoretical importance attached to taxation in the context of civilization by 
Lugard and Hailey is not confined to African colonization.  Oliver Wendall Holmes 
reported said that “Taxes are the price we pay for a civilized society” and this 
subsequently became the maxim of the IRS.  Contemporary approaches to taxation do 
not effectively attend to the interaction between taxes and the coercion of wage work.  
The link between taxes and this coercion is in part done through a conception of 
civilization that posits the overthrow of slavery and the implementation of free labor 
as a distinctive moment which elides and “forgets” that this transition came with much 
ambiguity over the difference between incentives, coercion, and slavery.  When 
 15 
 
Lugard observed that hut taxes were intended as a symbol or representation of 
population, he reflected on this with some hesitation.  In part this is because he 
understood all too well that this was comprehended by Africans subject to the tax.  In 
a letter to the Spectator in 1898, the explorer Mary Kingsley observes that Africans 
assume that “the thing you pay any one a fee for is a thing which is not your own.”lxx  
Lugard cites this as the reason why hut taxes have had an unfortunate reception in 
Nigeria.  Lugard sees this is evidence for more decentralized control for the 
administration of taxes, using the observation to argue for tax collection by chiefs, a 
hallmark of the theory of indirect rule.  But I read the significance of Kingsley’s 
remark differently.   
 It escapes the observation of both Kingsley and Lugard that perhaps the 
African’s negative reaction to the hut tax in the language of “fees” was more rigorous 
than their own understandings of how the tax functions; it is in fact perfectly rational.  
The counterpoising of slavery and freedom has a powerful precedent in western 
political philosophy.  But as practice, this counterpoising has been more ambivalent.  
The idea that one would be required to pay a fee or “tax” on something does assume 
that one is not entitled to “full” ownership of it.  In the case of the hut tax, it was in 
part a confiscation of property when the British asked for taxes based on the mere 
existence of huts.  Additionally, when other kinds of taxes (like poll or head taxes) 
made their appearance it was with a similar understanding.  Though Redding shows 
some of the ways that the taxes were incorporated into already existing African belief 
systems, it is also useful to think of how, despite ideological arguments otherwise, 
many people subject to a tax for the first time experience it with reasoned clarity that 
is then lost over years of habitual subjection.  The combined analysis of taxes as 
blurring the distinction between slavery, coercion, incentives, and education alongside 
the observation of them having the consequence of making Africans “misunderstand” 
the purpose of the tax, make a strong case for it being a significant phenomenon. 
Montesquieu wrote in 1748 that "a tax per head is the most natural to slavery; a 
tax on goods the most natural to liberty, because it comes home less directly to the 
person."
lxxi
  Only ten years later Rousseau follows this up; "We find in 'L'Esprit des 
Lox' [Montesquieu] that an impost per head is most proper to servitude, and real 
taxation more conformable to liberty.  That would be incontestable, if 'circumstances 
per head' were equal."
lxxii
  Rousseau goes on to argue that if the rate per head is 
proportioned to the means of the individual then the head tax ceases to be the closest 
thing to servitude.  He is exactly right, but once proportionality enters the equation, the 
tax ceases to be a head tax as we know it (in the southern African sense). Democracy, 
by all counts, should be the opposite of servitude.  Yet, Athenian democracy was built 
on the labor of slaves and was marked, interestingly, by four classes of differing tax 
paying groups, the slave class being exempt from taxes precisely because they had no 
rights to government, but existed as property.
lxxiii
    This is what is so striking about the 
imposition of the head tax in particular in South Africa, and perhaps why I read 
Kingsley’s comment as significant, if out of context.  Full citizenship in Athenian 
democracy was associated with not paying taxes, while paying taxes was associated 
with being a subject.  Though in both cases slavery is associated with not having to 
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pay taxes, the logic has shifted such that now liberal citizenship can be (ostensibly) 
reconciled with tax payment.   
  
Conclusion 
 
 Lugard’s views on taxes, though obviously informed by a paternalistic racism, 
are indicative of a larger problem for democratic theory.  Lugard carefully spelled out 
the tension between how taxes coerce labor and how that might relate to broader goals 
of human fulfillment that underlie the spirit of democracy.  But even while he saw the 
tension, he did not seek to resolve it.  I would suggest that this is because taxation is 
reified in democratic thought.  It is an institution that is assumed, not deduced.  The 
fundamental relationship between the symbolic and material content of the payment of 
taxes has been explored, but only so far.  Redding’s historical work on taxes in South 
Africa help shed some light on how, and perhaps why, the payment of taxes in 
democratic practice has to be processed outside of the discourse of liberal thought, 
colonial or otherwise.  As Marx has pointed out, work is central to the fulfillment of 
human potentiality.  Therefore, it should be of central concern to any political theory 
that takes seriously that self-government is a good thing.  Possibly the most important 
aspect of self-government is that it is not predetermined in the sense that if it is truly 
generated by the “self” (variously understood as an individual, a collective, or most 
importantly, fragmented) one cannot predict what it will do.  Even the “self” cannot 
predict it.    
 Providing incentives for democratic citizens to work seems to be an 
unquestionable mark of progress and civilization for many people, most especially 
Lugard.  But as Redding has shown, these “incentives” are not processed as such by 
those who receive them.  Contemporary democratic thought and practice is not so 
different from 19
th
 century South African colonial democratic thought.  We maintain 
the same assumption that wage work is consistent with democracy.  However, wage 
work begins and ends with fundamental inequality of resources and opportunity.  The 
observation that some people must provide “incentives” to others to work should 
already signal a problem of essential hierarchy.  If work begins and ends with the 
individual, freely chosen, incentives would not be necessary.  But of course that is not 
why incentives, the most clear one being taxes, exist.  They exist to convince people to 
do work for others that they otherwise would not do.  That is fundamentally coercive, 
and people do experience it as such.  In that way taxes are fundamentally in tension 
with democratic thought. 
Rather than being solved, this tension has been displaced.  Many Africans, as 
Redding shows, displace the tension into a mix of material and supernatural 
explanations.  The mixing of the two results in recognition of the power of the state 
that really does treat it not as some version of the “self” but as something exterior, 
something god-like.  This is not unlike contemporary understandings of the 
democratic state, where the assumption of the authority to tax marks a relationship to 
governance that flies in the face of the spirit of democracy as having contingent 
outcomes.  The fetishization of taxation as a democratic institution also inhibits our 
ability to see clearly that the “economy” and “politics” are intimately connected.  
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Moreover, this treating of taxes in a fetishistic manner makes it difficult to imagine a 
world where we work and govern of our own free will.     
  
 
 
                                                 
i
 For comprehensive arguments regarding the comparability of South Africa and the United States, see 
Anthony Marx’s Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South Africa, and 
Brazil.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), John Cell’s The Highest Stage of White 
Supremacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and George Frederickson’s The 
Comparative Imagination: on the history of racism, nationalism and social movements (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997). 
ii
 A focus on the creation of migratory labor as an effect of taxation can be found in Shula Marks,  
Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in natal.  London: Oxford University Press, 1970,  F. 
Cooper,  “Peasants, Capitalists, and Historians: A Review Article” in Journal of Southern African 
Studies 7: 284-314, 1981 and N. Ramdhani, “Taxation without representation: The Hut Tax System in 
Colonial Natal 1849-1898” in Journal of Natal and Zulu History 11, 1986, 12-25 
iii
 Gervase Clarence-Smith and Richard Moorsom,  'Underdevelopment and Class formation in 
Owamboland 1844-1917' in Robert Palmer and Neil Parsons (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in 
Central and Southern Africa Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. 
iv
 Leonard Thompson, A history of South Africa  (New Haven: Yale University Press,  1990), 115.  
v
 quoted Houghton 1971, 11   
vi
  Farouk Stemmet, The Golden Contradiction: A Marxist Theory of Gold (Aldershot, Hants, England ; 
Brookfield, Vt. : Avebury, 1996), 206. 
vii
 Martin Legassick, “The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography” in Economy and Society 
in Pre-Industrial South Africa, Eds. Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore (London: Longman, 1980), 178.   
viii
 In many cases these were indentured servants.   
ix
 Sven Steinmo, Taxation and democracy: Swedish, British, and American approaches to financing the 
modern state (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 51.   
x
 Steinmo 50   
xi
 The income tax is commonly associated with this progressive movement, and though it continues to 
be contentious, its reasoning is based on the notion of political and social equality cited above. Taxation 
has long been understood to be a method of political and economic control and coercion.    
xii
 Margaret.Levi, Of Rule and Revenue  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 1. 
xiii
 Levi 16   
xiv
 Levi 16 
xv
 Levi 44 
xvi
 It should also be observed that the social contract mode of understanding political citizenship has 
been challenged on the grounds that the ability to choose or not choose to be included is, in fact, a 
hopeless mirage in all cases, not just colonial situations. 
xvii
 Quoted in Stemmet 226.   
xviii
 Perham xxv-xlix 
xix
 Baron Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Hamden, 
Conn.: Archon Books, 1965), 617. 
xx
 For more on this legacy see Mindy Peden, “You Get What You Pay For:  Historicizing Business 
Metaphors of Government, Principles of Justice and ‘Benefit Theory’” in Studies in Political Economy, 
82 (autumn 2008), 105-129 
xxi
 Lugard 232-233 
xxii
 The Act itself was fundamentally a system of land tenure.  Rhodes designed such a system for the 
Glen Grey district that was specifically aimed at forcing a portion of men to work as migrant laborers.  
The Native Locations Survey explicitly states that “the intention was to locate then resident natives on 
 18 
 
                                                                                                                                            
these surveyed allotments, and to make no provision for the natural increase of the population, the 
surplus to find work elsewhere: so that…during the coming generation a limited number will be 
agriculturists, i.e. native farmers—and the rest will have to go out and work.” See Monica Wilson and 
Leonard Thompson, Eds., The Oxford History of South Africa Volume 2, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1971) 65.  As Wilson points out “peasant production was ‘idleness’ to the white man in need of 
labour.” (Ibid.)   
 
xxiii
 Lugard 234 
xxiv
 Lugard 234 
xxv
 Lugard 234 
xxvi
 Lugard 235 
xxvii
 Lugard 391 
xxviii
 Lugard 401 
xxix
 Lugard 401, “The fertility of the soil, his few wants, the physical capacity of his 
women for manual work, are all prompting causes for idleness, yet except when 
relegated to reserves, or when his status as a slave deprived him of all incentive, he is 
usually industrious.  Even as a slave his natural aptitude for work often makes him a 
willing and good worker.” 
 
xxx
 Lugard 401 
xxxi
 Lugard 404 
xxxii
 Lugard411 
xxxiii
 Lugard 411 
xxxiv
 Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's ghost: a story of greed, terror, and heroism in colonial Africa 
(Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1998). 
xxxv
 Lugard 411 
xxxvi
 Lugard 411 
xxxvii
 Lugard 411 
xxxviii
 Lugard 411-412 
xxxix
 Lugard 412 
xl
 Lugard 425 
xli
 Lugard 425 
xlii
 Lugard 426 
xliii
 Lugard 426 
xliv
 Nevertheless, Lugard is consistent with the principle of tacit consent or the reasoning of the 
Hobbesian state of nature.  In such understandings, Natives left to themselves will enslave one another, 
so that it is rational for them to choose colonial rule, even if not explicitly.   
xlv
 Lugard 457 
xlvi
 Lugard 435 
xlvii
 Lugard 7 
xlviii
 Lugard 5 “I am confident that the verdict of history will award high praise to the efforts and the 
achievements of Great Britain in the discharge of these great responsibilities.  For, in my belief, under 
no other rule –be it of his own uncontrolled potentates, or of aliens—does the African enjoy such a 
measure of freedom and of impartial justice, or a more sympathetic treatment, and for that reason I am a 
profound believer in the British Empire and its mission in Africa.”  
xlix
 Marx CGP 539 
l
 Karl Marx, “The Class Struggles in France” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Selected Works 
Volume 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers1983), 273. 
li
 Karl Marx, “Economic And Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844” in The Marx-Engels Reader.  (Edited 
by Robert Tucker. 2
nd
 edition, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1978), 75-76. “Human beings are 
species beings, not only because in practice and in theory they adopt the species as their object…but 
also because they treat themselves as the actual, living species…The animal is immediately identical 
 19 
 
                                                                                                                                            
with its life-activity.  It does not distinguish itself from it.  It is its life activity.  Human beings make 
their life-activity itself the object of their will and of their consciousness” 
lii
 Marx EPM 72 
liii
 Marx EPM74 
liv
 Marx EPM 75 
lv
 Marx EPM 76 
lvi
 Karl Marx, “Capital Volume 1” The Marx-Engels Reader, (Edited by Robert Tucker. , 2nd edition,  
New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1978), 327. 
lvii
 Baron William Malcolm Hailey, An African Survey: a study of problems arising in Africa south of 
the Sahara (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 643.  
lviii
 Johns, Sheridan.  From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South 
Africa 1882-1964 Volume 1 Protest and Hope 1882-1934.  Stanford, California: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1972 page 13 
lix
 Redding, Sean.  “Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Witchcraft, and Political Symbols in the 1880 
Transkeian Rebellion.”  Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 22, Number 2, June 1996, page 
249. 
lx
 Redding, 270. 
lxi
 Redding, Sean.  “Sorcery and The State.” Unpublished MS,  5 
lxii
 Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital. Trans. Agnes Schwarzschild. (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul), 465. 
lxiii
 Luxemburg 465 
lxiv
 Luxemburg 467 
lxv
 Luxemburg 412 
lxvi
 Luxemburg 413 
lxvii
 Luxemburg 413 
lxviii
 Woolf 6 
lxix
 Woolf 8 
lxx
 Lugard 252 
lxxi
 Quoted in Robert Jones, The Nature and First Principle of Taxation (London” PS King and Sons, 
1914), 73.   
lxxii
 Jones 78   
lxxiii
 See Pollux [150 AD] in Jones, 54. 
